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Abstract
Very often in some censorious healthcare scenario, there may be a need to
have some expert consultancies (especially by doctors) that are not available
in-house to the hospitals. Earlier, this interesting healthcare scenario of hir-
ing the ECs (mainly doctors) from outside of the hospitals had been studied
with the robust concepts of mechanism design with or without money. In
this paper, we explore the more realistic two sided matching in our set-up,
where the members of the two participating communities, namely patients
and doctors are revealing the strict preference ordering over all the members
of the opposite community for a stipulated amount of time. We assume that
patients and doctors are strategic in nature. With the theoretical analysis,
we demonstrate that the TOMHECs, that results in stable allocation of doc-
tors to the patients is strategy-proof (or truthful) and optimal. The proposed
mechanisms are also validated with exhaustive experiments.
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1. Introduction
The expert advices or consultancies provided by the expert consultants
(ECs) mainly doctors can be thought of as one of the most indispensable
events that occurs in the hospital(s) or medical unit(s) on a regular basis.
Over the past few years, there had been a perplexing growth in the demand
of ECs (especially doctors) during some critical surgical processes (or opera-
tions) that are taking place in the operation theatres (OTs) of the hospitals.
The unprecedented growth in the demand of the ECs, has made ECs busy
and scarce in nature. It is to be noted that, this unique nature (i.e. busy
and scarce) of ECs in the healthcare lobby provides an edge to the research
community in the healthcare domain to think of: How to manage or sched-
ule these limited (or scarce) ECs in the OTs of the hospitals, during some
censorious healthcare situation? In order to answer the above coined ques-
tion, previously, there had been a spate of research work in the direction of
handling the issues of scheduling the in-house ECs especially doctors [1, 2]
and nurses [3] in an efficient and effective manner. In [1, 2, 4, 5] different
techniques are discussed and presented to schedule the physicians that are
in-house to the hospitals in an efficient way for some critical operations that
are taking place in the OTs of that hospitals. In past, the work had been
also done in the direction of managing the OTs and the hospitals during the
patient congestion scenario. The work in [6, 7, 8] focuses on the question of:
how to effectively and efficiently plan and schedule the OTs? In [9, 10, 8] the
work has been done for allocating OTs on time to increase operating room
efficiency.
More importantly, in healthcare domain, one scenario that may be thought of
as a challenging issue is, say; in certain critical medical cases, there may be a
requirement of some external manpower in the form of ECs (mainly doctors)
that are not available in-house to the hospitals. Now, the immediate natural
question that came in the mind is that, how to have some external expertise
mainly in the form of doctors that are not available in-house to the hospitals?
Surprisingly, literature is very limited for this problem in healthcare domain.
This interesting situation of taking expert consultancy from outside of the in-
house medical unit during some censorious medical scenario (mainly surgical
process) was taken care by Starren et. al. [11]. Moreover, the introduction
of such a pragmatic field of study in the healthcare domain by Starren et.
al. [11] has given rise to several open questions for the researchers, such
as: (a) which ECs are to be considered as the possible expertise provider in
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the consultancy arena? (b) What incentives policies in the form of perks and
facilities are to be presented in-front of the ECs, so as to drag as many ECs
as possible in the consultancy arena?
In [12], the problem of hiring one or more doctors for a patient from outside
of the admitted hospital for some critical operation under monetary envi-
ronment (experts are charging for their services) with the infinite budget are
addressed. With the consideration that, ECs are having some social connec-
tions in real life, Singh et. al. [13] considered a budgeted setting of the
problem in [12] motivated by [14] for hiring k doctors out of the available n
doctors (k < n), such that the total payment made to the ECs do not exceed
the total budget of a patient. As opposed to the money involved hiring of
ECs as mentioned in [12, 13], another market of hiring ECs can be thought
of where the ECs are providing their expertise free of cost. Recently, Singh
et. al. [15] have addressed this idea, where the expert services are dis-
tributed free of cost. For hiring ECs in money free environment (i.e. money
is not involved in any sense) they have utilized the idea of one sided strict
preference (in this case strict preference from patient side) over the available
doctors in the consultancy arena.
In this paper, we have tried to model the ECs hiring problem as a two
sided preference market in healthcare domain motivated by [16, 17, 18, 19].
The idea behind studying the ECs hiring problem as a more appealing two
sided preference market is that, in this environment, the members present in
two different communities have the privilege to provide the strict preference
ordering over all the available members of the opposite community. For ex-
ample, in our case, we have two communities (or parties) in the consultancy
arena: (a) Patient party (b) Doctor party. So, the members of the patient
party provide strict preference ordering over all the available members (or
the subset of available members) in the doctor party and vice versa.
1.1. Our Contributions
The main contributions of our work are as follows.
• We have tried to model the ECs hiring problem as a two sided matching
problem in healthcare domain.
•We propose two mechanisms: a naive approach i.e. randomized mechanism
for hiring expert consultants (RAMHECs) and a truthful and optimal mech-
anism; namely truthful optimal mechanism for hiring expert consultants
(TOMHECs).
• We have also proved that for any instance of n patients and n doctors the
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allocation done by TOMHECs results in stable, truthful, and optimal alloca-
tion for requesting party.
• TOMHECs establish an upper bound of O(kn2) on the number of itera-
tions required to determine a stable allocation for any instance of n patients
and n doctors.
• A substantial amount of analysis and simulation are done to validate the
performance of RAMHECs and TOMHECs via optimal allocation measure.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes our
proposed model. Some required definitions are discussed in section 3. Section
4 illustrates the proposed mechanisms. Further analytic-based analysis of
the mechanisms are carried out in section 5. A detailed analysis of the
experimental results is carried out in section 6. Finally, conclusions are
drawn and some future directions are depicted in section 7.
2. System model
We consider the scenario, where there are multiple hospitals say n given
as ~ = {~1, ~2, . . . , ~n}. In each hospital ~i ∈ ~, there exists several patients
with different diseases (in our case patients and doctors are categorized based
on the diseases and areas of expertise respectively.) belonging to different in-
come group that requires somewhat partial or complete expert consultancies
from outside of the admitted hospitals. By partial expert consultancies it is
meant that, the part of expertise from the overall required expert consultan-
cies. The set of k different categories is given as: C = {c1, c2, . . . , ck}. The
set of all the admitted patients in different categories to different hospitals
is given as: P =
⋃
~k∈~
⋃
ci∈C
~˚i
k⋃
j=1
p~k
i(j) where p
~k
i(j) is the patient j belonging to ci
category admitted to ~k hospital. The expression ~˚
i
k in term p
~k
i(˚~i
k
)
indicates
the total number of patients in hospital ~k belonging to ci category. The
patients who need consultancy may belong to different income bars. So, in
this scenario, each hospital tries to select the patient from the lowest income
bar in a particular category (say ci category) who will get the free consulta-
tion. On the other hand, there are several doctors having different expertise
associated with different hospitals say H = {H1,H2, . . . ,Hn}. The set of all
the available doctors in different categories associated with different hospi-
tals is given as: D =
⋃
Hk∈H
⋃
cj∈C
H˚i
k⋃
i=1
dHk
j(i) where d
Hk
i(j) is the doctor j belonging
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to ci category associated to Hk hospital. The expression H˚
j
k in term d
Hk
j(H˚j
k
)
indicates the total number of doctors associated with hospital Hk in cj cate-
gory. Our model captures only a single category say ci but it is to be noted
that our proposed model works well for the system considering multiple cat-
egories simultaneously. Only thing is that we have to repeat the process k
times as k categories are existing. For simplicity purpose, in any category ci
we have considered the number of patients and number of doctors are same
i.e. n along with an extra constraint that each of the members of the par-
ticipating parties provides a strict preference ordering over all the available
members of the opposite party. But, one can think of the situation where
there are n number of patients and m number of doctors in a category such
that m 6= n (m > n or m < n). Moreover, the condition that every members
of the participating party is providing the strict preference ordering over all
the available members of the opposite community is not essential and can be
relaxed for all the three cases (i.e. m = n, m < n, and m > n).
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Figure 1: System model
By relaxation, it is meant that the members of the participating parties
may provide the strict preference ordering over the subset of the members
of the opposite party. At a particular time several doctors (> n) are pro-
viding their willingness to impart free consultancy to some patients present
in the consultancy arena in a particular category as shown in the right side
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of the Figure 1. In the schematic diagram shown in Figure 1, for represen-
tation purpose one doctor is selected from all the interested doctors from
each hospital belonging to a particular category ci. But in general one can
think of the situation where multiple doctors can be selected from the avail-
able doctors from a particular hospital in a particular category ci such that
|P i| =
∑
Hj∈H
H˙ij; where 0 ≤ H˙
i
j ≤ n is the number of doctors selected from
hospital Hj in ci category and placed into the consultancy arena. Follow-
ing the above discussed criteria, the third party selects n doctors out of all
the doctors in a particular category ci as a possible expert consultant and
is given as Di = {d
H1
i(1), d
H2
i(2), . . . , d
Hn
i(n)} and a set of selected patients from ci
category is given as P i = {p
~1
i(1), p
~2
i(2), . . . , p
~n
i(n)}. If not specified explicitly, n
denotes the total number of patients and the total number of doctors that
are participating in the consultancy arena in any category ci. For placing n
doctors in the consultancy arena from the available doctors, the third party
can take the help of the qualification of the doctors and number of successful
operations or consultancies given so far by that doctor. Each patient p~k
i(j)
reveals a strict preference ordering over the participating set of doctors Di in
a category ci and also each doctor d
Hk
i(t) provides the strict preference ordering
over the set of participating patients of category ci in the consultancy arena.
The strict preference ordering of the patient p
~j
i(k) over the set of doctorsDi is
denoted by ≻ik. More formally, the significance of d
Hj
i(ℓ) ≻
i
k d
Hk
i(m) is that the pa-
tient p~t
i(k) ranks doctor d
Hj
i(ℓ) above the doctor d
Hk
i(m). The preference profile of
all the patients for k different categories is denoted as ≻= {≻1,≻2, . . . ,≻k},
where ≻i denotes the preference profile of all the patients in category ci over
all the doctors in set Di represented as ≻
i= {≻i1,≻
i
2, . . . ,≻
i
n}. The prefer-
ence profile of all the patients in ci category except the patient r is given
as ≻i
−r= {≻
i
1,≻
i
2, . . . ,≻
i
r−1,≻
i
r+1, . . . ≻
i
n}. On the other hand, the doctors
may give preferences based on the location where he/she (henceforth he) and
the patients are located. The strict preference ordering of the doctor dHk
j(t) is
denoted by 3tj over the set of patients Pj , where p
~k
j(ℓ) 3
t
j p
~i
j(m) means that
doctor dHk
j(t) ranks p
~k
j(ℓ) above p
~i
j(m). The set of preferences of all the doctors in
k different categories is denoted as 3= {31,32, . . . ,3k}, where 3j contains
the strict preference ordering of all the doctors in cj category over all the pa-
tients in set Pj represented as 3j= {3
1
j ,3
2
j , . . . ,3
n
j }. The strict preference
ordering of all the doctors in cj category except the doctor s is represented
as 3−sj = {3
1
j ,3
2
j , . . . ,3
s−1
j ,3
s+1
j , . . . ,3
n
j }. It is to be noted that the allo-
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cation of the doctors to the patients for category ci under consideration is
captured by the allocation function Ai: ≻ × 3 → P i × Di. The resulting
allocation vector is given as A = {A1,A2, . . . ,Ak}. Each allocation vector
Ai ∈ A denotes the patient-doctor pairs belonging to the ci category denoted
as Ai =
⋃n;n
j=1;k=1 a
i
jk, where each a
i
lm ∈ Ai is a pair {p
~k
i(l), d
Hj
i(m)}. The match-
ing between the patients and doctors for any category ci is captured by the
mapping function M : P i ∪Di →Di ∪P i. More formally, M(p
~k
i(j)) = d
Hℓ
i(k)
means that patient p~k
i(j) is matched to d
Hℓ
i(k) doctor and M(d
Hk
i(ℓ)) = p
~ℓ
i(t) means
that doctor dHk
i(ℓ) is matched to p
~ℓ
i(t).
3. Required definitions
Definition 1. Blocking pair: Fix a category ck. We say that a pair p
~t
k(i)
and dHℓ
k(j) form a blocking pair for matching M, if the following three con-
ditions holds: (i) M(p~t
k(i)) 6= d
Hℓ
k(j), (ii) d
Hℓ
k(j) ≻
k
i M(p
~t
k(i)), and (iii) p
~t
k(i) 3
j
k
M(dHℓ
k(j)).
Definition 2. Stable matching: Fix a category ck. A matching M is
stable if there is no pair p~t
k(i) and d
Hℓ
k(j) such that it satisfies the conditions
mentioned in (i)-(iii) in Definition 1.
Definition 3. Perfect matching: Fix a category ck. A matching M is
perfect matching if there exists one-to-one matching between the members of
Pk and Dk.
Definition 4. Patient-optimal stable allocation: Fix a category ck.
A matching M is patient optimal, if there exists no stable matching M′
such that M′(p~t
k(j)) ≻
k
j M(p
~t
k(j)) or M
′(p~t
k(j)) =
k
j M(p
~t
k(j)) for at least one
p~t
i(j) ∈ P i. Similar is the situation for doctor-optimal stable allocation.
Definition 5. Strategy-proof for requesting party: Fix a category ck.
Given the preference profile ≻k and 3k of the patients and doctors in ck
category, a mechanismM is strategy-proof ( truthful) for the requesting party
if for each members of the requesting party Ak is preferred over Aˆk; where Aˆk
is the allocation when at least one member in requesting party is misreporting.
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4. Proposed mechanisms
The idea behind proposing randomized mechanism i.e. RAMHECs is to
better understand the more robust and philosophically strong optimal mech-
anism TOMHECs. The further illustration of the mechanisms are done under
the consideration that patient party is requesting. Moreover, one can utilize
the same road map of the mechanisms by considering doctors as the request-
ing party. This can easily be done by just interchanging their respective roles
in the mechanisms.
4.1. RAMHECs
The idea lies behind the construction of initialization phase is to handle
the system consisting k different categories. The algorithm is depicted in
Algorithm 1.
4.1.1. Upper bound analysis of RAMHECs
The overall running time of RAMHECs is O(1) +O(kn) = O(kn).
4.1.2. Correctness of RAMHECs
The correctness of RAMHECs is proved with the loop invariant technique
[20, 21]. The loop invariant that we have to prove is that at the end of the ith
iteration each of the patients in cj category gets one distinct doctor allocated.
We must show three things for the loop invariant technique to be true.
Initialization: It is true prior to the first iteration of the while loop. Just
before the first iteration of the while loop Aj ← φ. This confirms that Aj
contains no patient-doctor pair prior to the first iteration of the while loop.
Maintenance: The loop invariant to be true, we have to show that if it
is true before each iteration of while loop, it remains true before the next
iteration. The body of the while loop allocates a doctor to a patient in a
particular category i.e. each time Aj is incremented by 1. Just before the
ith iteration, the Aj data structure contains (i−1) number of patient-doctor
pairs. After the ith iteration, the Aj data structure contains i patient-doctor
pairs. This way at the end of the ith iteration all the i patients gets a distinct
doctor and the patient-doctor pairs are stored in Aj [1. . i].
Termination: The third property is to check, what happens when the while
loop terminates. The condition causing the while loop to terminate is that,
for any category cj , each of the patients are allocated with one distinct doctor
leading to n patient-doctor pairs in Aj data structure. Because each loop
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iteration increments Aj by 1, we must have |Aj| = n when all n patients are
already processed. So, when the loop terminates we have a data structure
Aj [1. . n] that is already processed and it consists of n patient-doctor pairs.
If the RAMHECs is true for a particular category cj ∈ C it will remain
true when all category in C taken simultaneously. Hence, the RAMHECs is
correct.
Algorithm 1 RAMHECs (D, P , C, ≻, 3)
Output: A = {A1,A2, . . . ,Ak}
1: begin
/* Initialization phase */
2: A← φ
3: for each ci ∈ C do
4: k ← 0, i ← 0, d∗ ← φ, p∗ ← φ, Ai ← φ, P
∗ ← φ, D∗ ← φ
5: i ← select(P) ⊲ return the index of patient from patient set.
6: P∗ ← Pi
7: i ← select(D) ⊲ return the index of doctor from doctor set.
8: D∗ ← Di
/* Allocation phase */
9: while |Ai| 6= n do
10: t← rand(P∗) ⊲ return index of randomly selected patient.
11: p∗ ← p~k
i(t)
12: k ← rand(≻it, D
∗) ⊲ returns the index of randomly selected
doctor from the patient t preference list.
13: d∗ ← dHℓ
i(k)
14: Ai ← Ai ∪ {(p
∗, d∗)}
15: Pi ← Pi \ p
∗ ⊲ Removes the allocated patients from available
patient list.
16: Di ← Di \ d
∗ ⊲ Removes the allocated doctors from available
doctor list.
17: end while
18: A ← A ∪ Ai
19: end for
20: return A
21: end
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4.1.3. Illustrative example
For understanding purpose, let the category be c3 (say eye surgery). The
set of patient from 4 different hospitals ~ = {~1, ~2, ~3, ~4} is given as: P3 =
{p~23(1), p
~3
3(2), p
~4
3(3), p
~1
3(4)}. The set of available doctors engaged to 4 different
hospitals H = {H1,H2,H3,H4} is given as: D3 = {d
H3
3(1), d
H1
3(2), d
H4
3(3), d
H2
3(4)}.
The preference profile of patient set P3 is given as: p
~2
3(1) = [d
H2
3(4) ≻
3
1 d
H4
3(3) ≻
3
1
dH33(1) ≻
3
1 d
H1
3(2)], p
~3
3(2) = [d
H4
3(3) ≻
3
2 d
H2
3(4) ≻
3
2 d
H1
3(2) ≻
3
2 d
H3
3(1)], p
~4
3(3) = [d
H2
3(4) ≻
3
3
dH13(2) ≻
3
3 d
H3
3(1) ≻
3
3 d
H4
3(3)], p
~1
3(4) = [d
H1
3(2) ≻
3
4 d
H4
3(3) ≻
3
4 d
H2
3(4) ≻
3
4 d
H3
3(1)]. Similarly,
the preference profile of doctor set D3 is given as: d
H3
3(1) = [p
~2
3(1) 3
1
3 p
~3
3(2) 3
1
3
p~13(4) 3
1
3 p
~4
3(3)], d
H1
3(2) = [p
~3
3(2) 3
2
3 p
~1
3(4) 3
2
3 p
~2
3(1) 3
2
3 p
~4
3(3)], d
H4
3(3) = [p
~4
3(3) 3
3
3
p~23(1) 3
3
3 p
~3
3(2) 3
3
3 p
~1
3(4)], d
H2
3(4) = [p
~1
3(4) 3
4
3 p
~4
3(3) 3
4
3 p
~2
3(1) 3
4
3 p
~3
3(2)]. Given the
preference profiles, while loop in line 9-17 randomly selects patient p~43(3) from
the available patients list P3. Line 12 of the RAMHECs randomly selects
doctor dH23(4) from the available preference ordering of p
~4
3(3). At the end of
first iteration of the while loop, the RAMHECs captures (p~43(3), d
H2
3(4)) pair in
the A3 data structure. In the similar fashion, the remaining allocation is
done. The final patient-doctor allocation pair done by the mechanism is A3
= {(p~43(3), d
H2
3(4)), (p
~3
3(2), d
H4
3(3)), (p
~1
3(4), d
H3
3(1)), (p
~2
3(1), d
H1
3(2))}.
4.2. TOMHECs
Our main focus is to propose a mechanism that satisfy the two impor-
tant economic properties: truthfulness, and optimality . The TOMHECs is
illustrated in Algorithm 2.
4.2.1. Running time
The total running time of TOMHECs is given as: T (n) =
∑k
i=1(O(1) +
(
∑n
i=1O(n))) = O(kn
2)
Algorithm 2 TOMHECs (D, P , C, ≻, 3)
Output: A = {A1,A2, . . . ,Ak}
1: begin
/* Initialization phase */
2: i ← 0, A← φ
/* Allocation phase */
3: for each ci ∈ C do
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4: Ai ← φ
5: i ← select(P)
6: P∗ ← P i
7: i ← select(D)
8: D∗ ← Di
9: for each dHk
i(j) ∈ D
∗ do
10: Π(dHk
i(j))← φ ⊲ Π(d
Hk
i(j)) data structure keeps track of set of
p~k
i(j) ∈ P i requesting to d
Hk
i(j).
11: end for
12: while |Ai| 6= n do
13: for each free patient p~k
i(j) ∈ P i do
14: d∗ ← select most preferred doctor from ≻ij not approached till
now.
15: Π(d∗)← Π(d∗) ∪ p~k
i(j)
16: end for
17: for each engaged doctor dHk
i(j) ∈ Di do
18: if |Π(dHk
i(j))| > 1 then
19: p∗ ← select best(3ji , Π(d
Hk
i(j)))
20: if (p~k
i(j), d
Hk
i(j)) ∈ Ai and p
∗ 3
j
i p
~k
i(j) then
21: Ai ← Ai \ (p
~k
i(j), d
Hk
i(j))
22: Ai ← Ai ∪ (p
∗, dHk
i(j))
23: Π(dHk
i(j)) ← Π(d
Hk
i(j)) \ Π(d
Hk
i(j))− {p
∗}
24: else if (p~k
i(j), d
Hk
i(j)) /∈ Ai then
25: Ai ← Ai ∪ (p
∗, dHk
i(j))
26: Π(dHk
i(j)) ← Π(d
Hk
i(j)) \ Π(d
Hk
i(j))− {p
∗}
27: end if
28: else if |Π(dHk
i(j))| == 1 then
29: if (Π(dHk
i(j)), d
Hk
i(j)) /∈ Ai then
30: Ai ← Ai ∪ (Π(d
Hk
i(j)), d
Hk
i(j))
31: end if
32: end if
33: end for
34: end while
35: A ← A ∪ Ai
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36: end for
37: return A
38: end
4.2.2. Correctness of the TOMHECs
The correctness of the TOMHECs is proved with the loop invariant tech-
nique [20, 21].
The loop invariant : Fix a category ci. At the start of ℓ
th iteration of the while
loop, the number of temporarily processed patient-doctor pairs or in other
words the number of patient-doctor pairs held by Ai is given as: | ∪
ℓ−1
j=1 A
′
j|,
where A′j is the net patient-doctor pairs temporarily maintained in the set
A′j at the j
th iteration. So, on an average the number of patients or doc-
tors (whomsoever is greater) that are to be explored in further iterations
are n − | ∪ℓ−1j=1 A
′
j|. From the construction of the TOMECs it is clear that
after any ℓth iteration this condition holds: 0 ≤ n − | ∪ℓi=1 A
′
j| ≤ n; where
1 ≤ ℓ ≤ n2. The net minimum number of patient-doctor pairs that can
be processed temporarily at any iteration may be zero. Hence, inequality
0 ≤ n − | ∪ℓi=1 A
′
j| ≤ n is always true. We must show three things for this
loop invariant to be true.
Initialization: It is true prior to the first iteration of the while loop. Just
before the first iteration of the while loop, in TOMHECs the inequality
0 ≤ n − | ∪ℓi=1 A
′
j| ≤ n blows down to 0 ≤ n − 0 ≤ n ⇒ 0 ≤ n ≤ n
i.e. no patient-doctor pair is temporarily added to Ai prior to the first iter-
ation of while loop. This confirms that Ai contains no patient-doctor pair.
Maintenance: For the loop invariant to be true, if it is true before each
iteration of the while loop, it remains true before the next iteration of the
while loop. The body of while loop allocates doctor(s) to the patient(s) with
each doctor is allocated to a patient; i.e. each time the cardinality of Ai is
either incremented by some amount or remains similar to previous iteration.
Just before the ℓth iteration the patient-doctor pairs temporarily added to
Ai are ∪
ℓ−1
i=1A
′
j. So, one can conclude from here that the number of patient-
doctor pairs that are left is given by inequality: 0 ≤ n − | ∪ℓ−1i=1 A
′
j| ≤ n.
After the (ℓ − 1)th iteration, the available number of patient-doctor pair
n− | ∪ℓ−1i=1 A
′
j| ≥ 0 can be captured under two cases:
Case 1: If |Ai| = n: This case will lead to exhaust all the remaining patient-
doctor pair in the current ℓth iteration and no patient-doctor pair is left for the
next iteration. The inequality n−(|∪ℓ−1i=1A
′
i∪A
′
ℓ|) = n−(|∪
ℓ
i=1A
′
i|) = n−|Ai|
= 0. Hence, it means that all the remaining patient-doctor is absorbed in
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this iteration and no patient-doctor pair is left for processing.
Case 2: If |Ai| < n: This case captures the possibility that there may be
the scenario when few patient-doctor pairs from the remaining patient-doctor
pairs may still left out; leaving behind some of the pairs for further iterations.
So, the inequality n − (| ∪ℓ−1i=1 A
′
i ∪ A
′
ℓ|) > 0 ⇒ n > n − (| ∪
ℓ
i=1 A
′
i|) > 0 is
satisfied.
From Case 1 and Case 2, at the end of ℓth iteration the loop invariant is
satisfied.
Termination: It is clear that in each iteration the cardinality of output
data structure i.e. Ai either incremented by some amount or remains as the
previous iteration. This indicates that at some ℓth iteration the loop ter-
minates by dissatisfying the condition of the while loop |Ai| 6= n at line
12. When the loop terminates it is for sure that |Ai| = n. We can say
n − | ∪ℓi=1 A
′
i| = 0 ⇒ 0 ≤ n. Thus, this inequality indicates that all the n
patient and doctors in ci category are processed and each patient allocated
a best possible doctor when the loop terminates.
If the TOMHECs is true for the ci ∈ C category it will remain true when all
category in C taken simultaneously. Hence, the TOMHECs is correct.
4.2.3. Example
Considering the initial set-up discussed in section 4.1.3. According to
line 13-16 of TOMHECs each of the patients p~23(1), p
~3
3(2), p
~4
3(3), and p
~1
3(4) are
requesting to the most preferred doctor from their respective preference list
i.e. dH23(4), d
H4
3(3), d
H2
3(4), and d
H1
3(2) respectively. In the next step, we will check if
any requested doctor among dH33(1), d
H1
3(2), d
H4
3(3), and d
H2
3(4) has got the multiple
request from the patients in P3. Now, it can be seen that, in the first iter-
ation of TOMHECs doctor dH23(4) have got requests from patients p
~2
3(1), and
p~43(3). As each doctor can be assigned to only one patient, so this competitive
environment between patient p~23(1), and p
~4
3(3) can be resolved by considering
the strict preference ordering of doctor dH23(4) over the available patients in
P3. From the strict preference ordering of doctor d
H2
3(4) it is clear that patient
p~43(3) is preferred over patient p
~2
3(1). Hence, patient p
~2
3(1) is rejected. So, for
the meanwhile p~33(2) gets a doctor d
H4
3(3), p
~4
3(3) gets a doctor d
H2
3(4), and p
~1
3(4)
gets a doctor dH13(2). Now, as the patient p
~2
3(1) do not get his/her (hence-
forth his) most preferred doctor i.e. dH23(4) from his preference list. So, he
will request the second best doctor i.e. dH43(3) from his preference list. As
13
doctor dH43(3) is already been requested by p
~3
3(2), the similar situation now
occurs in case of doctor dH43(3) where patients p
~2
3(1) and p
~3
3(2) are simultane-
ously requesting to doctor dH43(3). Looking at the preference list of d
H4
3(3), we
get, patient p~23(1) is preferred over p
~3
3(2). So, patient p
~3
3(2) is rejected. Now,
p~33(2) request the second best doctor i.e. d
H2
3(4) from his preference list. In
the similar fashion, the remaining allocation is done. The final allocation
is:{(p~23(1), d
H4
3(3)), (p
~3
3(2), d
H3
3(1)), (p
~4
3(3), d
H2
3(4)), (p
~1
3(4), d
H1
3(2))}.
4.3. Several properties
The proposed TOMHECs has several compelling properties. These prop-
erties are discussed next.
Proposition 1. The matching computed by the Gale-Shapley mechanism
[18, 19] results in a stable matching.
Proposition 2. A stable matching computed by Gale-Shapley mechanism
[18, 19] is requesting party optimal.
Proposition 3. Gale-Shapley mechanism [18, 19] is truthful for the request-
ing party.
Following the above mentioned propositions and motivated by [18, 19]
we have proved that the TOMHECs results in stable, optimal, and truthful
allocation when all the k different categories are taken simultaneously.
Lemma 1. TOMHECs results in a stable allocation for the requesting party
(patient party or doctor party).
Proof. Fix a category ci ∈ C. Let us suppose for the sake of contradiction
there exists a blocking pair (p~k
i(j), d
Hl
i(j)) that results in an unstable matching
M for the requesting party. As their exists a blocking pair (p~k
i(j), d
Hl
i(j)) it may
be due to the case that (p~k
i(j), d
Hj
i(k)) and (p
~j
i(k), d
Hl
i(j)) are their in the resultant
matching M. This situation will arise only when dHl
i(j) ≻
i
j d
Hj
i(k) i.e. in the
strict preference ordering of patient p~k
i(j) doctor d
Hl
i(j) is preferred over doctor
d
Hj
i(k). From the matching result M obtained, it can be seen that in-spite
the fact that dHl
i(j) ≻
i
j d
Hj
i(k); d
Hl
i(j) is not matched with p
~k
i(j) by the TOMHECs.
So, this upset may happen only when doctor dHl
i(j) received a proposal from
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a patient p
~j
i(k) to whom d
Hl
i(j) prefers over p
~k
i(j) i.e. p
~j
i(k) 3
j
i p
~k
i(j). Hence, this
contradicts the fact that the (p~k
i(j), d
Hl
i(j)) is a blocking pair. As their exists no
blocking pair, it can be said that the resultant matching by TOMHECs is
stable.
From our claim that, the TOMHECs results in a stable matching in a par-
ticular category ci, it must be true for any category. Hence, it must be true
for the system considering the k categories simultaneously.
Lemma 2. A stable allocation resulted by TOMHECs is requesting party
(patient or doctor) optimal.
Proof. Fix a category ci. Let us suppose for the sake of contradiction that the
allocation set M obtained using TOMHECs is not an optimal allocation for
requesting party (say patient party). Then, from Lemma 1 there exists a sta-
ble allocationM′ such thatM′(p~k
i(j)) ≻
i
j M(p
~k
i(j)) or M
′(p~k
i(j)) =
i
j M(p
~k
i(j))
for at least one patient p~k
i(j) ∈ P i. Therefore, it must be the case that,
some patient p~k
i(j) proposes to M
′(p~k
i(j)) before M(p
~k
i(j)) since M
′(p~k
i(j)) ≻
j
i
M(p~k
i(j)) and is rejected by M
′(p~k
i(j)). Since doctor M
′(p~k
i(j)) rejects patient
p~k
i(j), the doctor M
′(p~k
i(j)) must have received a better proposal from a pa-
tient p
~j
i(k) to whom doctor M
′(p~k
i(j)) prefers over p
~k
i(j) i.e. p
~j
i(k) 3
j
i p
~k
i(j). Since,
this is the first iteration at which a doctor rejects a patient under M′. It
follows that the allocation M is preferred over allocation M′ for the patient
p~k
i(j). Hence, this contradicts the fact that the allocation set M obtained
using TOMHECs is not an optimal allocation. As their exists an optimal
allocation M.
Form our claim that, the TOMHECs results in optimal allocation in a par-
ticular category ci, it must be true for any category. Hence, it must be true
for the system considering the k categories simultaneously.
Lemma 3. A stable allocation resulted by TOMHECs is requesting party
(patient or doctor) truthful.
Proof. Fix a category ci. Let us suppose for the sake of contradiction that
the matching set M obtained using TOMHECs is not a truthful allocation
for requesting party (say patient party). The TOMHECs results in stable
matching M when all the members of the proposing party reports their true
preferences. Now, let’s say a patient p~k
i(j) misreport his preference list ≻
i
j and
getting better off in the resultant matching M′. Let P ′i be the set of patients
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who are getting better off in M′ as against M. Let D′i be the set of doctors
matched to patients in P ′i in matching M
′. Let dHℓ
i(k) be the doctor that p
~k
i(j)
gets in M′. Since M is stable, we know that dHℓ
i(k) cannot prefer p
~k
i(j) to the
patient got in M, because this would make (p~k
i(j), d
Hℓ
i(k)) a blocking pair in M
(see Lemma 1). In other words, doctor M(dHℓ
i(k)) 3
k
i p
~k
i(j). Now, if M(d
Hℓ
i(k))
patient would not improve in M′ then M(dHℓ
i(k)) 3
k
i p
~k
i(j). Hence, d
Hℓ
i(k) can
not be matched with p~k
i(j) in M
′, a contradiction. Therefore, patient in M
also improves in M′. That is, D′i is not the only set of doctors in M
′ of
those patient who are getting better off in M; but also the set of doctors
where patient in M improve in M′. In other words, each doctor in Di is
matched to two different patient from Pi in match M and M
′, being better
off in M than in M′. It can also be proved using Lemma 1 that M′ is
not stable; a contradiction that terminates the proof.
From our claim that, the TOMHECs results in a truthful matching in a
particular category ci, it must be true for any category. Hence, it must be
true for the system considering the k categories simultaneously.
5. Further analytics-based analysis
In order to provide sufficient reasoning to our simulation results presented
in section 6, the two proposed mechanisms are in general analyzed on the
ground of the expected distance of allocation done by the mechanisms from
the top most preference. As a warm up, first the the analysis is done for any
patient j, to estimate the expected distance of allocation from the top most
preference. After that the analysis is extended to more general setting where
all the patients present in the system are considered. It is to be noted that
the results revealed by the simulations can easily be verified by the lemmas
below.
Lemma 4. The allocation resulted by RAMHECs for any patient (or doc-
tor) j being considered first is on an average n
2
distance away from its most
preferred doctor (or patient) i.e. E[Z] ≃ n
2
; where Z is the random variable
measuring the distance from the top most preference.
Proof. Fix a category ci ∈ C, and an arbitrary patient j being considered
first. In RAMHECs, for any arbitrary patient (AP) being considered first
are allotted a random doctor from his preference list. The index position of
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the doctor in the preference list is decided by k, where k = 1, 2, . . . , n. Now,
when a doctor is selected randomly from the preference list any of these k
(1 ≤ k ≤ n) may be selected. So any index k could be the outcome of the
experiment (allocation of a doctor) and it is to be noted that selection of
any such k is equally likely. Therefore, for each k such that 1 ≤ k ≤ n any
kth doctor can be selected with probability 1
n
. For k = 1, 2, . . . , n, we define
indicator random variable Xk where
Xk = I{k
th doctor selected from patients′ preference list}
Xk =
{
1, if kth doctor is selected
0, otherwise
Taking expectation both side, we get;
E[Xk] = E[I{k
th doctor selected from patients′ preference list}]
As always with the indicator random variable, the expectation is just the
probability of the corresponding event [20]:
E[Xk] = 1 · Pr{Xk = 1}+ 0 · Pr{Xk = 0} = 1 · Pr{Xk = 1} =
1
n
For a given call to RAMHECs, the indicator random variable Xk has the
value 1 for exactly one value of k, and it is 0 for all other k. For Xk = 1,
we can measure the distance of kth allocated doctor from the most preferred
doctor in the patient j ’s preference list. So, let dk be the distance of k
th
allocation from the best preference. More formally, it can be represented in
the case analytic form as:
Z =


d0 : If 1
st agent is selected from the preference list (k = 1)
d1 : If 2
nd agent is selected from the preference list (k = 2)
...
...
dn−1 : If n
th agent is selected from the preference list (k = n)
Where Z is the random variable measuring the distance of the allocation
from the patient’s top most preference. Here, d0 = 0, d1 = 1, d2 = 2, . . .,
dn−1 = n−1. It is to be observed that, once the doctor k is selected from the
patient j ’s preference list, the value calculation of dk is no way dependent on
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k. Now, observe that the random variable Z that we really care about can
be formulated as:
Z =
n∑
k=1
Xk · dk−1
Taking expectation both side. We get;
E[Z] = E
[
n∑
k=1
Xk · dk−1
]
=
n∑
k=1
E[Xk · dk−1] (by linearity of expectation)
=
n∑
k=1
E[Xk]·E[dk−1] (Xk and dk−1 are independent)
=
n∑
k=1
1
n
· E[dk−1] =
1
n
n∑
k=1
E[dk−1]
=
1
n
n∑
k=1
dk−1 (once k is fixed dk−1 becomes constant)
=
1
n
·
(n− 1)(n)
2
=
(n− 1)
2
≃
n
2
,
as claimed.
Lemma 5. In RAMHECs, E[D] ≃ n
2
16
; where D is the total distance of all
the patients in the system from the top most preference.
Proof. Fix a category ci ∈ C. We are analyzing, the expected distance of the
allocations done to the patients by RAMHECs from the top most preferences.
For this purpose, as there are n patients, the index of these patients are
captured by i such that i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Without loss of generality, the
patients are considered in some order. The index position of the doctor in
any patient j ’s preference list is decided by k, where k = 1, 2, . . . , n. For
any patient i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) selected first, when a doctor is selected randomly
from the preference list any of the available k (1 ≤ k ≤ n) doctors can be
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selected. So, any index k could be the outcome of the experiment (allocation
of doctor) and any such k is equally likely. But what could the case, if instead
of considering the patient in the first place, say a patient is selected in ith
iteration. In that case, from the construction of RAMHECs the length of
the preference list of the patient under consideration would be n − i + 1.
So, when a doctor is selected randomly from the preference list, any of the
(n − i + 1) doctors may be selected. It is to be noted that the selection of
any of the (n− i+1) doctors is equally likely. Therefore, for a patient under
consideration in ith iteration, for each k such that 1 ≤ k ≤ n− i+ 1 any kth
doctor can be selected with probability 1
n−i+1
. Here, we are assuming that
each agent’s top preferences are still remaining when that agent is considered
by the RAMHECs. To get the lower bound this is the best possible setting. If
an agent is not provided that list, he will be further away from his top most
preference. For each patient i and for k = 1, 2, . . . , n, we define indicator
random variable Xik where
Xik = I{k
th doctor selected from patient i′s preference list}
Xik =
{
1, if kth doctor is selected from patient i’s preference list
0, otherwise
Taking expectation both side, we get;
E[Xik] = E[I{k
th doctor selected from patient i preference list}]
As always with the indicator random variable, the expectation is just the
probability of the corresponding event:
E[Xik] = 1 · Pr{Xik = 1}+ 0 · Pr{Xik = 0} = 1 · Pr{Xik = 1} =
1
n− i+ 1
For a given call to RAMHECs, the indicator random variable Xik has the
value 1 for exactly one value of k, and it is 0 for all other k. For Xik = 1,
we can measure the distance of kth allocated doctor from the most preferred
doctor in the patient j ’s preference list. So, let dik be the distance of k
th
allocation from the best preference. More formally, it can be represented in
the case analytic form as:
D =


di0 : If 1
st agent is selected from the preference list (k = 1)
di1 : If 2
nd agent is selected from the preference list (k = 2)
...
...
di(n−1) : If n
th agent is selected from the preference list (k=n)
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Where D is the total distance of all the patients in the system from the top
most preference. It is to be observed that, once the doctor k is selected from
the patient j ’s preference list, the value calculation of dk is no way dependent
on k. Now, observe that the random variable D that we really care about is
given as:
D ≥
n∑
i=1
n−i+1∑
k=1
Xik · dik
Taking expectation both side. We get;
E[D] ≥ E[
n∑
i=1
n−i+1∑
k=1
Xik · dik]
=
n∑
i=1
n−i+1∑
k=1
E[Xik · dik] (by linearity of expectation)
=
n∑
i=1
n−i+1∑
k=1
E[Xik]·E[dik] (Xik and dik are independent)
=
n∑
i=1
n−i+1∑
k=1
1
n− i+ 1
· dik
≥
n∑
i=1
n−i+1∑
k=1
1
n
· dik
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
n−i+1∑
k=1
dik
=
1
n
[ n
2∑
i=1
n−i+1∑
k=1
dik +
n∑
i=n
2
n−i+1∑
k=1
dik
]
≥
1
n
[ n
2∑
i=1
n−i+1∑
k=1
dik
]
+
[
n∑
i=n
2
n−i+1∑
k=1
0
]
(1)
1discarding the lower order terms
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≥
1
n
[ n
2∑
i=1
n−i+1∑
k=n
2
dik
]
≥
1
n
[ n
2∑
i=1
n−i+1∑
k=n
2
din
2
]
(2)
=
1
n
[ n
2∑
i=1
n−i+1∑
k=n
2
n
2
]
=
1
2
[ n
2∑
i=1
n−i+1∑
k=n
2
1
]
≥
(
1
2
n
2∑
j=1
j
)
− 1
=
1
2
[
n
2
(n
2
+ 1)
2
]
− 1
=
n2 + 2n− 16
16
≃
n2
16
as claimed. It is to be observed that for each agent, the expected distance of
allocation done by RAMHECs from the top preference in an amortized sense
is n
16
.
Lemma 6. The expected number of rejections for any arbitrary patient (or
doctor) j resulted by TOMHECs is constant. If the probability of any k length
rejection is considered as 1
2
i.e. P r{Yk = 1} =
1
2
then E[Y ] = 2; where Y
is the random variable measuring the total number of rejections made to the
patient (or doctor) under consideration.
Proof. Fix a category ci ∈ C, and an arbitrary patient j. To analyze the
expected number of rejections suffered by the patient under consideration in
case of TOMHECs, we capture the total number of rejections done to any
patient j by a random variable Y . So, the expected number of rejections
2replacing each term of the series by its first term
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suffered by any patient j is given as E[Y ]. It is considered that the rejection
by any member k = 0, . . . , n− 1, present on the patients’ j preference list is
an independent experiment. It means that, the m length rejections suffered
by an arbitrary patient j is no way dependent on any of the previous m− 1
rejections. Let us suppose for each 0 ≤ k ≤ n−1, the probability of rejection
by any kth doctor be 1
2
(it can be any value between 0 and 1 depending on
the scenario). For k = 0, . . . , n − 1, we define indicator random variable Yk
where
Yk = I{k length rejection}
Yk =
{
1, if k length rejection
0, otherwise
Taking expectation both side, we get;
E[Yk] = E[I{k length rejection}]
As always with the indicator random variable, the expectation is just the
probability of the corresponding event:
E[Yk] = 1 · Pr{Yk = 1}+ 0 · Pr{Yk = 0} = 1 · Pr{Yk = 1} =
(
1
2
)k
Observe that the random variable Y that we really care about is given
as,
Y =
n−1∑
k=0
Yk
Taking expectation both side. We get;
E[Y ] = E
[
n−1∑
k=0
Yk
]
=
n−1∑
k=0
E[Yk] (by linearity of expectation)
=
n−1∑
k=0
(
1
2
)k
<
∞∑
k=0
(
1
2
)k
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=
1
1− (1
2
)
= 2
as claimed. Moreover, if we consider the probability of kth rejection as 2
3
then,
the expected number of rejections will be given as 3 i.e E[Y ] = 3. Similarly,
E[Y ] = 10 if the probability of kth rejection is taken as 9
10
. It means that,
even with the high probability of rejection to any arbitrary patient j by the
members of the proposed party, there is a chance that after constant number
of rejections patient j will be allocated a good doctor according to his choice.
Hence, we can say that each agent’s allocation is not far away from his top
most preference.
Lemma 7. In TOMHECs, E[R] = 2n, where R is the random variable
measuring the total number of rejections made to all the patients.
Proof. Fix a category ci ∈ C. We are analyzing the total number of rejections
suffered by all the patients in expectation. For this purpose, as there are
n patients, the index of these patients are captured by i such that i =
1, 2, . . . , n. The index position of the doctor in any patient j′s preference
list is decided by k, where k = 1, 2, . . . , n. We capture the total number of
rejections done to all patients by a random variable R. So, the expected
number of rejections suffered by all the patients is given as E[R]. It is
considered that the rejection by any member k = 1, . . . , n−1, present on the
patients’ i preference list is an independent experiment. It means that, the
m length rejections suffered by an arbitrary patient i is no way dependent
on any of the previous m − 1 rejections. Let us suppose for each patient i
and for each 1 ≤ k ≤ n − 1, the probability of rejection by any kth doctor
be 1
2
(it can be any value between 0 and 1 depending on the scenario). For
k = 1, . . . , n− 1, we define indicator random variable Rik where
Rik = I{k length rejection ofi
th patient}
Rik =
{
1, if k length rejection of ith patient
0, otherwise
Taking expectation both side, we get;
E[Rik] = E[I{k length rejection of i
th patient}]
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As always with the indicator random variable, the expectation is just the
probability of the corresponding event:
E[Rik] = 1 · Pr{Rik = 1}+ 0 · Pr{Rik = 0} = 1 · Pr{Rik = 1} =
(
1
2
)k
Observe that the random variable R that we really care about is given
as,
R =
n∑
i=1
n−i∑
k=1
Rik
Taking expectation both side. We get;
E[R] = E
[
n∑
i=1
n−i∑
k=1
Rik
]
=
n∑
i=1
n−i∑
k=1
E[Rik] (by linearity of expectation)
=
n∑
i=1
n−i∑
k=1
(
1
2
)k
<
n∑
i=1
∞∑
k=0
(
1
2
)k
=
n−1∑
k=0
1
1− (1
2
)
= 2n
as claimed.
Corollary 1. It is to be observed that for each patient, the expected number
of rejections in case of TOMHECs in an amortized sense is O(1). As we
have shown that for all n agents, the expected number of rejection are O(n).
6. Experimental findings
The experiments are carried out in this section to compare the efficacy of
the TOMHECs based on the preference lists of the doctors and patients gen-
erated randomly using Random library in Python. RAMHECs is considered
as the benchmark mechanism.
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6.1. Simulation setup
For creating a real world healthcare scenario we have considered 10 dif-
ferent categories of patients and doctors for our simulation purpose. One of
the scenarios that is taken into consideration is, say there are equal number
of patients and doctors present in each of the categories along with the as-
sumption that each of the patients are providing strict preference ordering
(generated randomly) over all the available doctors and also each of the doc-
tors are providing strict preference ordering over all the available patients.
Second scenario is the case where, there are equal number of patients and
doctors are present in the market. Each of the members in the respective
parties are providing the strict preference ordering over the subset of the
members of the opposite community. The other two scenarios i.e. m < n
and m > n with partial preference are not shown due to page limit.
6.2. Performance metrics
The efficacy of TOMHECs is measured under the banner of two important
parameters: (a) Satisfaction level (ηℓ): It is defined as the sum over
the difference between the index of the doctor (patient) allocated from the
patient’s (doctor’s) preference list to the index of the most preferred doctor
(patient) by the patient (doctor) from his/her preference list. Considering the
requesting party, the ηjℓ for cj category is defined as: η
j
ℓ =
∑n
i=1
(
ξi − ξi
)
;
where, ξi is the index of the doctor (patient) allocated from the initially
provided preference list of the patients (doctors) i, and ξi is the index of
the most preferred doctor (patient) in the initially provided preference list of
patient (doctor) i. For k categories, ηℓ =
∑k
j=1
∑n
i=1
(
ξi − ξi
)
. It is to be
noted that lesser the value of satisfaction level higher will be the satisfaction
of patients or doctors. (b) Number of preferable allocation (ζ): The
term ”preferable allocation” refers to the allocation of most preferred doctor
or patient from the revealed preference lists by the patients or the doctors
respectively. For a particular patient or doctor the preferable allocation is
captured by the function f : P i → {0, 1}. For the category ci, the number
of preferable allocation (NPA) is defined as the number of patients (doctors)
getting their first choice from the initially provided preference list. So, ζi =∑n
j=1 f(p
~ℓ
i(j)). For k categories ζ =
∑k
i=1
∑n
j=1 f(p
~ℓ
i(j)).
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6.3. Simulation directions
The three directions are seen for measuring the performance of TOMHECs,
they are: (1) All the patients and doctors are reporting their true preference
list. (2) When fraction of total available members of the requesting party
are misreporting their preference lists. (3) When fraction of total available
members of the requested party are misreporting their preference lists.
6.4. Result analysis
In this section, the result is simulated for the above mentioned three cases
and discussed.
Table 1: Abbreviations used in simulation
Abbreviation Description
RAMHECs-P Patients allocation using RAMHECs without variation.
TOMHECs-P Patients allocation using TOMHECs without variation.
RAMHECs-D Doctors allocation using RAMHECs without variation.
TOMHECs-D Doctors allocation using TOMHECs without variation.
TOMHECs-PS Patients allocation using TOMHECs with small variation.
TOMHECs-DS Doctors allocation using TOMHECs with small variation.
TOMHECs-PM Patients allocation using TOMHECs with medium variation.
TOMHECs-DM Doctors allocation using TOMHECs with medium variation.
TOMHECs-PL Patients allocation using TOMHECs with large variation.
TOMHECs-DL Doctors allocation using TOMHECs with large variation.
Expected amount of patients/doctors deviating. The following analy-
sis motivated by [20] justifies the idea of choosing the parameters of variation.
Let χj be the random variable associated with the event in which j
th patient
in ci category varies its true preference ordering. Thus, χj = {j
th patient
varies preference ordering}. χ =
∑n
j=1 χj . We can write E[χ] =
∑n
j=1E[χj ]
=
∑n
j=1 1/8 = n/8. Here, Pr{j
th patient varies preference ordering} is the
probability that given a patient whether he will vary his true preference or-
dering. The probability of that is taken as 1/8 (small variation).
Our result analysis is broadly classified into four categories:
• Case 1a: Requesting party with full preference (FP) In Figure
2a and Figure 2b, it can be seen that the satisfaction level of the request-
ing party in case of TOMHECs is more as compared to RAMHECs. As
TOMHECs always allocates the most preferred member from the preference
list. Under the manipulative environment of the requesting party, it can be
seen in Figure 2a and Figure 2b that, the satisfaction level of the system
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in case of TOMHECs with large variation is less than the satisfaction level
of the system in case of TOMHECs with medium variation is less than the
satisfaction level of the system in case of TOMHECs with small variation is
less than the satisfaction level of the system in case of TOMHECs. It is nat-
ural from the construction of TOMHECs. Considering the second parameter
i.e. number of preferable allocation, it can be seen in Figure 3a and Figure
3b that the NPA of the requesting party in case of TOMHECs is more as
compared to RAMHECs.
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Figure 2: ηℓ of requesting party with m == n
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Figure 3: ζ of requesting party with m == n
Under the manipulative environment of the requesting party, it can be seen in
Figure 3a and Figure 3b that, the NPA of the system in case of TOMHECs
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with large variation is less than the NPA of the system in case of TOMHECs
with medium variation is less than the NPA of the system in case of TOMHECs
with small variation is less than the NPA of the system in case of TOMHECs.
It is natural from the construction of TOMHECs.
• Case 1b: Requesting party with partial preference (PP) In Figure
4a and Figure 4b, it can be seen that the satisfaction level of the request-
ing party in case of TOMHECs is more as compared to RAMHECs. As
TOMHECs always allocates the most preferred member from the preference
list.
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Figure 4: ηℓ of requesting party with m == n
Under the manipulative environment of the requesting party, it can be seen
in Figure 4a and Figure 4b that, the satisfaction level of the system in case
of TOMHECs with large variation is less than the satisfaction level
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Figure 5: ζ of requesting party with m == n
of the system in case of TOMHECs with medium variation and even less
than RAMHECs is less than the satisfaction level of the system in case of
TOMHECs with small variation even less than RAMHECs is less than the
satisfaction level of the system in case of TOMHECs. It is natural from the
construction of TOMHECs. Considering the second parameter i.e. number
of preferable allocation, it can be seen in Figure 5a and Figure 5b that the
NPA of the requesting party in case of TOMHEcs is more as compared to
RAMHECs. Under the manipulative environment of the requesting party, it
can be seen in Figure 5a and Figure 5b that, the NPA of the system in case
of TOMHECs with large variation is less than the NPA of the system in case
of TOMHECs with medium variation is less than the NPA of the system in
case of TOMHECs with small variation is less than the NPA of the system
in case of TOMHECs.
• Case 2a: Requested party with full preference (FP) In Figure
6a, Figure 6b and Figure 7a, Figure 7b, it can be seen that the satisfaction
level and the NPA respectively of the requested party in case of TOMHECs
is more as compared to RAMHECs. It can be seen from Figure 2a-3b and
Figure 6a-7b that the TOMHECs is requesting party optimal. It is natural
from the construction of TOMHECs.
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Figure 6: ηℓ of requested party with m == n
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Figure 7: ζ of requested party with m == n
• Case 2b: Requested party with partial preference (PP) In
Figure 8a, Figure 8b and Figure 9a, Figure 9b, it can be seen that the
satisfaction level and the NPA respectively of the requested party in case of
TOMHECs is more as compared to RAMHECs.
30
 0
 2000
 4000
 6000
 8000
 10000
 12000
 14000
 16000
 18000
100 200 300 400 500
Sa
tis
fa
ct
io
n 
Le
ve
l
Number of Agents
RAMHECs-P
TOMHECs-P
TOMHECs-PS
TOMHECs-PM
TOMHECs-PL
(a) ηℓ of patients
 0
 2000
 4000
 6000
 8000
 10000
 12000
 14000
 16000
 18000
100 200 300 400 500
Sa
tis
fa
ct
io
n 
Le
ve
l
Number of Agents
RAMHECs-D
TOMHECs-D
TOMHECs-DS
TOMHECs-DM
TOMHECs-DL
(b) ηℓ of doctors
Figure 8: ηℓ of requested party with m == n
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Figure 9: ζ of requested party with m == n
7. Conclusions and future works
We have tried to model the ECs hiring problem as a two sided matching
problem in healthcare domain. This paper proposed an optimal and truthful
mechanism, namely TOMHECs to allocate the ECs to the patients. The
more general settings are of n patients and m doctors (m 6= n or m == n)
with the constraint that members of the patient party and doctor party can
provide the preference ordering (not necessarily strict) over the subset of the
members of the opposite party can be thought of as our future work.
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